**Measuring Beliefs’ Incorrectness**

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It is often claimed that rational believers “aim” at believing *correctly* – that is, at believing true propositions, and not believing false propositions. One way of interpreting this claim is as the thesis that the rationality of a system of beliefs is determined by how its *expected degree of incorrectness* (according to what we might call “the rational probability function”) compares with the expected incorrectness of the available alternatives. But this thesis requires that a belief-system’s “degree of incorrectness” can be *measured*, at least on an interval scale.  Arguments are presented here for the view that the appropriate measure of doxastic incorrectness must have the features that formal epistemologists call “separability”, “strict propriety”, and “symmetry”. It follows that this measure is given by a “quadratic scoring rule” (such as the so-called “Brier score”). It is also argued that doxastic incorrectness only ranks belief-systems that are defined over the *same* set of propositions: belief-systems defined over different sets of propositions are strictly incomparable. Finally, some suggestions are made about how to extend this approach beyond precise systems of credences to belief-systems of other kinds – such as those that involve imprecise credences, conditional beliefs, “full” beliefs, and suspensions of judgment.